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THE RECOGNITION OF CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION
TO MILITARY SERVICE AS AN INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHT
MATTHEW LIPPMAN*
INTRODUCTION
Since the passage of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
in 1948,1 numerous international instruments have expanded and
refined the rights enumerated in the declaration.' The recognition
of a right to conscientious objection to military service is a conspic-
uous omission from the list of internationally guaranteed human
rights. Briefly stated, conscientious objection is the refusal to par-
ticipate in the armed services based upon opposition to war. This
opposition may rest upon reasons of religious belief, philosophy,
morality or political ideology.
3
The failure to recognize a right to conscientious objection to mili-
tary service is explicable by the fact that, as noted in 1977 by the
Legal Affairs Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe, "there are few areas in which respect for
human rights conflicts as sharply with the interests of the state as
in the matter of conscientious objection to military service."' The
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1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(111), U.N. Doc. A/810, at
7 (1948).
2. UNITED NATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPILATION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRU-
MENTS, U.N. Doc. ST/HR/i/Rev. 2, U.N. Sales No. E.83.XIV.1 (1983).
3. Conscientious objectors have been classified into three groups: religious, ethical and
political objectors. The religious objector finds support for their views in biblical texts and
may belong to a church which preaches pacifism as a religious obligation. The ethical objec-
tor bases their opposition to military service on a personal moral code; while the political
objector usually opposes participation in a particular war on the grounds of international and
domestic law and policy. Individuals within these three broad categories of conscientious
objectors adhere to differing views towards military service. Some are willing to perform non-
combatant military service. Others object to any form of military service, but are willing to
serve in a civilian capacity. A third group refuses to submit to any form of secular authority
or to the policies of a particular regime. States differ as to their treatment of these various
categories of objectors. See generally Smith & Bell, The Conscientious-Objector Pro-
gram-A Search for Sincerity, 19 U. PITT. L. REV. 695 (1958); Russell, Development of
Conscientious Objector Recognition in the United States, 20 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 409
(1952).
4. Report on the Right of Conscientious Objection to Military Service, Eur. Parl.
Ass., 29th Sess., Doc. No. 4027, at 19 (1977) [hereinafter 1977 European Report on Consci-
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individual obligation to militarily defend the state is viewed as a
fundamental obligation of citizenship5 and the conscientious objec-
tor is viewed as threatening national security and as undermining
the equality of obligation of all citizens, rich as well as poor, to
sacrifice for the welfare of society.' As was observed during the
1983 debate on conscientious objection in the European Parliament,
"people who refuse to perform their military service ought to be
considered beyond the pale, by their own choice, since they have
refused to participate in the most vital matter of their country's
survival and safety."7 The conscientious objector popularly is per-
ceived as an "abnormal, cowardly or selfish creature" 8 whose re-
fusal to fight is "something of which to be ashamed."9 Surveys indi-
cate that a relatively small number of people believe it is important
to respect the beliefs of conscientious objectors and to exempt them
from armed military service. 10
At the same time, the human rights of even the most controver-
sial and unpopular members of society ought to be considered as
deserving of protection. Any violation of human rights presents a
precedent which can be used to rationalize the violation of addi-
tional rights." Instead of being "shut up in asylums, as though con-
scientious objection were a crime or a kind of madness," 2 it must
be affirmed that, as Chief Justice Hughes stated in United States v.
Macintosh,13 "in the forum of conscience, duty to a moral power
higher than the State has always been maintained."' 4 Conscientious
objection also provides one of the few mechanisms through which
individuals are able to assert the primacy of international law and
morality over the self-interest of sovereign states.'
5
entious Objection].
5. See United States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902, 908 (D. Mass. 1969).
6. See United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 625-27 (1931), overruled by
Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946); United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644,
652-53 (1929), overruled by Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946).
7. 1982-1983 EUR. PARL. DEB. (No. 1-293) 259 (Jan. 10-14, 1983) (remarks of Mr.
Gontikas).
8. Id. at 249 (remarks of Mrs. Macciocchi).
9. Id. But see generally W. GAYLIN, IN THE SERVICE OF THEIR COUNTRY: WAR RE-
SISTERS IN PRISON (1970).
10. See generally J. DAVIS JR. & K. DOLBEARE, LITTLE GROUPS OF NEIGHBORS: THE
SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM 92 (1968).
11. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. at 908.
12. EUR. CONSULT. Ass. DEB. 18th Sess. 853 (Jan. 26, 1967) (remarks of Mr.
Amatucci) (debate on the report of the Legal Committee).
13. Macintosh, 283 U.S. at 633 (Hughes, C.J., dissenting).
14. Id. at 627.
15. See generally Greenawalt, All or Nothing At All: The Defeat of Selective Consci-
entious Objection, 1971 SUP. CT. REV. 31.
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CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION
Initially, this Article reviews the arguments for and against con-
scientious objection. Section two then outlines the domestic legal
procedures for the determination and treatment of conscientious
objectors in various countries. Despite the limited recognition stan-
dards for the determination of conscientious objection, there is no
internationally recognized universal right to conscientious objection.
International efforts to establish a right to conscientious objection,
as an expression of the right of freedom of conscience, thought and
religion, then are reviewed and evaluated. In conclusion, it is ar-
gued that a right to conscientious objection already is implicitly
recognized by provisions of international instruments which limit
the use of armed aggression and which establish an international
right to peace. Conscientious objection to aggressive war, rather
than only being conceived of as an expression of the individual right
to freedom of conscience, thought and religion, thus may be viewed
as an affirmation of the fundamental collective human right of all
peoples to peace. In order to assure recognition and protection of
the universal right of conscientious objection to aggressive war, it
should be formally protected by international declaration.
I. THE DEBATE OVER CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION TO MILITARY
SERVICE
A. The Case Against Conscientious Objection
The difficulty in determining the sincerity of an individual's pur-
ported beliefs makes recognition of conscientious objection prob-
lematic-a seemingly sincere individual may be motivated by cow-
ardice rather than conscience."6 As was observed during the 1967
debate in the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, "un-
til someone invents a truth machine"' 17 it will remain difficult to
evaluate the claimant's alleged opposition to war.' 8
At any rate, military service is a fundamental obligation of all
citizens, particularly during periods of national emergency, and the
conscientious objector should not be permitted to gain the benefits
of living in a society which they refuse to militarily defend.'" It is
considered to be unconscionable that "there should be people who
use the very principles that others are defending with their lives as
16. EUR. CONSULT. Ass. DEB., supra note 12, at 858 (remarks of Marchese Lucifero
d'Aprigliano).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. 1982-1983 EUR. PARL. DEB., supra note 7, at 259 (remarks of Mr. Gontikas).
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a basis for refusing to participate in that defence."20
The recognition of conscientious objection necessarily weakens a
nation's moral and military defense.21 Combat troops who risk in-
jury and death resent that conscientious objectors are being ac-
corded preferential treatment by being exempted from military ser-
vice and, as a result, question whether the government's willingness
to exempt objectors from combat indicates a lack of commitment to
prosecute the war. 22 During the European Parliamentary Assembly
debates on conscientious objection, it was argued that no commu-
nist country recognizes conscientious objection to military service
and that the West cannot afford to weaken its defenses by recogniz-
ing or introducing liberalized conscientious objection provisions. 23
The number of objectors in those democratic states which permit
conscientious objection already has reached an alarming level. For
example, the number of objectors in Italy reportedly increased from
roughly 100 in 1973 to over 20,000 in 1982.24
The true conscientious objectors argue that they are willing to
fight for freedom against the forces of totalitarianism and tyr-
anny. 25 Extolling the virtues of those who refuse to engage in
armed combat implicitly portrays those who take up arms in de-
fense of their country as possessing a "second-class morality"2 and
"second-class conscience."27
Conscientious objection may be appropriate in a future, utopian
society, but at present it only will contribute to anarchy and disor-
der.2" Although conscientious objectors claim their actions are
guided by the moral imperative to refrain from violence, they fail to
recognize that the resort to military force, at times, is morally re-
quired. 9 Opponents of conscientious objection also point out that
once it is conceded that an individual has the right to be exempted
from military service, there is no principled basis for refusing to
exempt individuals from other legal obligations such as the pay-
20. EUR. CONSULT. Ass. DEB., supra note 12, at 860 (remarks of Marchese Lucifero
d'Aprigliano).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 859-60.
23. Id. at 860.
24. 1982-1983 EUR. PARL. DEB., supra note 7, at 259 (remarks of Mrs. Gaiotti de
Biase).
25. EUR. CONSULT. Ass. DEB., supra note 12, at 859 (remarks of Marchese Lucifero
d'Aprigliano).
26. Id. at 860.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 855 (remarks of Mr. Amatucci).
29. Id.
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ment of taxes,3" which may be used to fund military activities or
research.
B. The Case .for Conscientious Objection
It is a fundamental democratic principle that the state should
respect the divergent beliefs and opinions of the citizenry and, to
the extent possible, the state should refrain from requiring individu-
als to act in a fashion which contradicts these beliefs and opin-
ions. 31 The fact that the conscientious objector adheres to an un-
popular view which contradicts the prevailing norms of society
"does not make it an any less profound and tenaciously held convic-
tion, which ought to be respected. '3 2 While it may be difficult to
evaluate the sincerity of a claimant's beliefs, democratic values dic-
tate that risks should be taken in order to promote and to protect
individual liberty. 33
The evidence does not support the argument that recognition of
conscientious objection or an expansion of the standards for deter-
mining conscientious objection will lead to an avalanche of claim-
ants. For instance, despite widespread opposition to the Vietnam
War in the United States, only slightly more than one percent of
registrants were exempted from service as conscientious objectors.3 4
In The Federal Republic of Germany and in Austria, reportedly
less than one percent of those subject to military service are classi-
fied as conscientious objectors. 35 The stigma attached to conscien-
tious objection and the patriotic duty felt by most individuals to
serve in the military will insure that the number of conscientious
objectors will remain relatively small.36 Further, proponents of con-
scientious objection point out that the number of conscientious ob-
jectors exempted from military service pales in comparison to the
number of deferments granted on other grounds such as mental,
30. Id. at 859 (remarks of Marchese Lucifero d'Aprigliano).
31. 1982-1983 EUR. PARL. DEB., supra note 7, at 258-59 (remarks of Mrs. Van den
Heuwel).
32. Conscientious Objection to Military Service: Report Prepared in Pursuance of
Resolutions 14(XXXIV) and 1982/30 of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimina-
tion and Protection of Minorities by Mr. Asbjorn Eide and Mr. Chama Mubanga-Chipoya,
Members of the Sub-Commission, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/30/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No.
E.85.XIV.1 at 3 (1985) [hereinafter Conscientious Objection].
33. 1982-1983 EUR. PARL. DEB., supra note 7, at 259 (remarks of Mr. Gendebien).
34. Wolff, Conscientious Objection: Time for Recognition as a Fundamental Human
Right, 6 AsiLs INT'L L.J. 65, 83 (1982).
35. Report on the Right of Conscientious Objection, Eur. Consult. Ass., 18th Sess.,
Doe. No. 2170, at 8 (1967) [hereinafter 1967 European Report on Conscientious Objection].
36. Wolff, supra note 34, at 83.
1990]
5
Lippman: The Recognition of Conscientious Objection to Military Service as
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1990
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
physical and moral considerations."7
There are also pragmatic reasons for recognizing conscientious
objection to military service. Most objectors make poor soldiers,
present disciplinary problems and undermine military morale. It is
therefore preferable to assign these individuals to alternative work
of national importance where they can contribute to the public
welfare a.3
The exemption of conscientious objectors from military service
will not necessarily lead to individuals claiming exemption from
other social responsibilities. Military service is unique in requiring
that individuals undergo training in the techniques of killing and
maiming human beings. Other social obligations usually do not en-
tail the direct taking of human life and require a violation of what
is perceived as a fundamental moral prescription against the killing
of another .3 The conscientious objector also is not arbitrarily refus-
ing military service, but instead is seeking legal recognition of their
status. Lastly, the conscientious objector is able to fulfill their mili-
tary obligation in an alternative fashion and still meaningfully con-
tribute to the public good. 40 Reviewing the arguments offered by
the proponents and the opponents of conscientious objection, Pro-
fessor Kent Greenawalt concludes that the fact "many countries
have no such exemption shows there is no universal sentiment that
the pro arguments outweigh the con. ... "'I'
II. CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION AND DOMESTIC AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. Conscientious Objection and Domestic Law
The question of the recognition and the appropriate scope of con-
scientious objection primarily arises in countries with conscription,
or, as it is commonly referred to, a civilian draft for military ser-
vice. In states with voluntary military service, claims of conscien-
tious objection generally are limited to those members of the mili-
tary who file claims for conscientious objector status ("in-service"
objectors). However, in many of the latter countries, conscription
may be invoked in the event of a national emergency and, in the
37. Silva, The Constitution, the Conscientious Objector, and the "Just" War, 75
DICK. L. REV. 1, 52-53 (1970).
38. 1967 European Report on Conscientious Objection, supra note 35, at 6.
39. Wolff, supra note 34, at 84.
40. See generally Girouard, 328 U.S. at 64-65.
41. Greenawalt, supra note 15, at 48.
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event of such a crisis, some decision as to the recognition and pro-
tection of draftees who claim conscientious objector status would
have to be made by government officials.42
Slightly over half of the countries with conscription do not pro-
vide for conscientious objection. In those countries which do recog-
nize conscientious objection, the most commonly accepted basis for
exemption on the grounds of conscientious objection is religious be-
lief. Some states only exempt those who belong to so-called peace
churches which preach pacifism or which reject the legitimacy of
secular authority. Others take a broader view and exempt those of
any religion whose opposition to war is based upon sincerely held
beliefs which derive from biblical authority. In Northern and West-
ern Europe, conscientious objection also is recognized on ethical
and humanist grounds. No national law appears to provide an ex-
emption for those whose opposition to a particular conflict is based
upon international law or policy. Recently, some western countries
have indicated they will recognize conscientious objection based
upon the illegality or immorality of the possible deployment of nu-
clear weapons. However, Panama does not require naturalized citi-
zens or aliens to participate in armed conflicts against their country
of origin in order to avoid placing such persons in the position of
being compelled to fight against their original homeland.43
42. Conscientious Objection, supra note 32, at 11. The following countries do not have
conscription: Australia (in peacetime), Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Bhutan,
Botswana, Brunei, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic (except for civil
servants), Congo, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Holy See,
Hong Kong, Iceland (may be introduced in case of national emergency), India (may be
introduced in times of national emergency), Indonesia, Ireland (may be introduced in times
of national emergency), Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein,
Luxembourg, Malawi (compulsory call-up in times of national emergency), Malaysia,
Maldives, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Monaco, Nauru, Nepal, New Zealand, Nigeria,
Oman, Pakistan, Panama (in peacetime), Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Rwanda, Samoa, Se-
negal, Sierra Leone, Sikkim, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Tonga (in peace-
time), Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Re-
public of Tanzania, United States of America, Zambia, Zimbabwe. Id. at 30 (Annex II).
The following countries provide for, but do not enforce their conscription laws: Burma, Haiti,
Honduras, Ivory Coast (only selectively enforced), Upper Volta, Zaire. Id.
43. Id. at 11. Countries with conscription in which provision is made for conscientious
objectors to perform civilian or unarmed military service include: Austria, Belgium, Den-
mark, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Guyana, Israel (for women), Leba-
non, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden. Id. at 30 (Annex II). Coun-
tries with conscription in which provision is made for conscientious objectors to perform non-
combatant service in the armed forces include: German Democratic Republic, Greece, Portu-
gal, South Africa, Uruguay. A number of countries informally permit objectors to perform
non-combatant service: Argentina, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Republic of Korea,
Soviet Union, Switzerland. Id. Countries with conscription which do not recognize conscien-
tious objection include: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Benin, Brazil, Cape Verde, Chile,
China, Colombia, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ecuador, Egypt,
1990]
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Application for conscientious objector status usually must be
filed at any time following a claimant's call-up into the armed
forces. In some countries the claim must be filed within a limited
period following call-up, usually within fifteen or thirty days. The
claimant's induction often is suspended or they are informally as-
signed to non-combat service pending the disposition of their appli-
cation. In some countries information regarding the procedure for
applying for conscientious objection is fully available, while in
others, it is not easily obtained or its dissemination is prohibited.""
Those responsible for administering military induction determine
the merits of claims for conscientious objector status in various
countries. The trend, however, is towards vesting the decision in a
specialized tribunal. In either case, the relevant administrative body
must determine whether the grounds upon which the applicant ba-
ses their objection falls within the statutory criteria and whether
the applicant is sincere in their conscientious objection. The latter
decision, of course, involves the often difficult task of evaluating the
motivation of relatively young individuals who often are emotion-
ally and intellectually immature. In some states the tribunals are
composed of military personnel who often are reluctant to recognize
claims for conscientious objector status. In other countries, the
tribunals are comprised of civilian and military personnel. A third
group of states provide for civilian panels. Various countries permit
an appeal to a higher administrative tribunal or to a judicial body.
El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras, Iran, Iraq, Israel
(for men), Ivory Coast, Mali, Mongolia, Morocco, Niger, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines,
Romania, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Venezuela,
Zambia. Id.
There is no reliable information on the number of conscientious objectors throughout the
world. Some indication of the extent of conscientious objection is suggested by data supplied
to the United Nations by various countries: Austria, as of 1980, 4,011 applications for con-
scientious objector status had been filed and 3,188 were accepted; Belgium, as of 1979, 1,762
applications for conscientious objector status had been filed and 1,287 were accepted; France,
in 1980, 1,000 applications for conscientious objector status were filed and 552 were ac-
cepted; Netherlands, in 1978 there were 2,432 applications for conscientious objector status
and 624 were accepted (no reported action on 1,321 cases), in 1979 there were 3,091 appli-
cations for conscientious objection and 36 were accepted (no reported action on 2,873 cases);
Norway, in 1978 there were 2,000 applications for transfer to civilian service and 1,860
recognized claims; Spain, it is estimated that 825 conscientious objectors were imprisoned
between 1958 and 1976; Sweden, in 1980 there were 3,836 applications for conscientious
objection, 3,531 cases were examined and 2,961 were accepted; Switzerland, 354 objectors
were convicted of refusing military service in 1980 and there were 593 such cases in 1981.
Id. at 25-26 (Annex I).
44. Id. at 12. The dissemination of information regarding conscientious objection is not
automatically provided or is prohibited in various countries including: Denmark, France,
German Democratic Republic, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Spain,
Turkey. Id. at 29 (Annex I).
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In others, the decision of the initial tribunal is final and no appeal
is available."'
Where conscientious objection is legally recognized, conscientious
objectors usually are required to perform some form of alternative
service. This requirement is designed to balance the individual's in-
terest in exemption from military service against the state's interest
in insuring that the individual contribute to the national defense
and welfare. The alternative service requirement also serves to de-
ter those who may seek conscientious objector status out of a desire
to avoid armed military service.4"
Objectors in countries with alternative service provisions often
are assigned non-combat roles in the armed forces. In some coun-
tries, objectors who believe that all use of force is immoral may be
assigned to positions outside the military, such as in a hospital.
Some innovative programs view alternative service as a vehicle to
advance the public welfare rather than to punish objectors and per-
mit involvement in international development activities and peace
activism and research. Objectors who deny the legitimacy of the
government and who refuse alternative service, of course, risk crim-
inal penalties."7
The term of alternative service usually is longer than regular mil-
itary service. In some countries only those involved in alternative
service outside the military are required to serve a longer term.
Often the additional period of service is relatively brief and is
designed to compensate for the fact that military recruits are re-
quired to undergo annual reserve training upon the expiration of
their tour of duty. In other countries the period of alternative ser-
vice is considerably longer than that served by those who undergo
military training and is designed to deter individuals from claiming
conscientious objector status.'8 The longer term also reflects the
fact that military service and its accompanying dangers is viewed
as much more threatening and difficult than is alternative service.
Unsuccessful claimants for conscientious objector status, success-
ful claimants who refuse alternative service, and objectors who re-
side in states which do not recognize conscientious objection are all
45. Id. at 12.
46. Id. Alternative service, depending on the country and the grounds upon which the
individual bases their objection to military service, may fall into one of three categories: (a)
non-combat roles in the military; (b) social service and economic development projects; (c)
peace and peace research activity. Id. at 13.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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subject to criminal sanctions. These penalties range from imprison-
ment to capital punishment and dishonorable discharge where an
objector is a member of the armed forces. In some cases, persistent
objection to military service may be considered a mental distur-
bance which may result in psychiatric internment.49 Those who are
punished also may forfeit their civil rights and may be denied ac-
cess to public benefits, education and employment. 5
There are two approaches to imprisonment. One imposes a rela-
tively short prison sentence in order to convince the objector to
change their mind and to submit to induction. If upon release the
objector again refuses military service, the objector is sentenced to
another prison term. This may result in an objector spending most
of their life in prison, although in some countries a pardon is
granted after two or more prison terms. In a second group of coun-
tries, long prison terms of up to ten or fifteen years are imposed in
order to punish the objector and to deter other individuals from
resisting conscription into the armed forces. 51
Conscientious objectors who face imprisonment often flee their
country of residence and seek political asylum abroad. Many coun-
tries grant asylum provided they are satisfied that the resister pos-
sesses a well founded fear of persecution on the grounds of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
adherence to a political opinion. In practice, asylum decisions are
49. Id.
50. Id. at 14.
51. Id. at 13-14. Prison terms imposed on conscientious objectors vary between coun-
tries: Albania, up to five years (in peacetime and during a war or emergency), more than five
years imprisonment, or the death sentence; Brazil, between four months to a year in peace-
time and from two to five years during war; Bulgaria, up to three years during peacetime and
up to twenty years or death in wartime; China, various laws punish incitement to desertion
with penalties including death; Czechoslovakia, two to ten years; Denmark, nine to fifteen
months in prison depending on the offense; Finland, those refusing alternative service may be
imprisoned for up to a year; France, two to twenty-four months in prison; Federal Republic
of Germany, a sentence of up to five years; Greece, an initial sentence of twelve years may be
imposed which, in practice, is substantially reduced; Hungary, up to five years imprisonment
during peacetime and between ten and fifteen years or the death penalty during war; Israel,
repeated short prison terms or loss of civil rights; Italy, between two and four years in prison;
Libya, up to one year in prison with a loss of civil rights; Netherlands, those refusing alterna-
tive service may face a prison sentence not exceeding two years; Norway, refusal of all forms
of national service may result in a prison sentence not exceeding three months (twelve
months for continued refusal); Romania, up to five years; South Africa, up to three years;
Spain, refusal to perform military service may lead to up to three years imprisonment; Swe-
den, a continued refusal to perform military or non-military service may result in up to four
months confinement in an open prison; Switzerland, a maximum penalty of up to six months
imprisonment in semi-liberty; Yugoslavia, one to ten years imprisonment with additional
penalties imposed for any subsequent refusal to enter the armed forces. Id. at 27-29 (Annex
I).
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determined by the political relationship between the countries in-
volved and whether the asylum country views the military activities
of the resister's country of residence as justified.52
Reliable information on the number of conscientious objectors
imprisoned or discriminated against is difficult to obtain. However,
some indication of the type of difficulties confronting conscientious
objectors is suggested by the country reports contained in Amnesty
International's 1989 report covering the period between January
and December 1988.11 Such examples of discrimination against
conscientious objectors are listed below.
An Austrian psychology student active in the peace movement
was imprisoned after being denied conscientious objector status. He
was released after a month of imprisonment and was granted con-
scientious objector status.5"
Czechoslovak law offers no civilian alternative to those objecting
to military service. A young Christian objector was sentenced to
eighteen months imprisonment for evading military service. He was
amnestied and released after two months. Also, three members of a
peace group who organized to promote demilitarization and the
rights of conscientious objectors were arrested and charged with of-
fenses carrying a potential penalty of up to three years in prison. 55
Numerous French conscientious objectors were prosecuted and
sentenced to prison terms of up to fifteen months. 6 Several objec-
tors who were imprisoned had their applications rejected since they
had not filed their applications until their call-up orders had been
issued. One was imprisoned for seven months in military barracks,
spent extensive periods in solitary confinement, and ultimately was
sentenced to a six month suspended sentence. Another objector was
released after serving nine months of a twelve month sentence.
When he again refused military service he was sentenced to an-
other eight months in prison."
Greece released its first conscientious objector to refuse military
service on purely pacifist grounds after the objector had served
twenty months of a twenty-six month sentence. Another objector
subsequently was arrested and sentenced to five years in prison. His
52. Id. at 14-15. See generally id. at 31 (Annex III).
53. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT (1989).
54. Id. at 212.
55. Id. at 215.
56. Id. at 217-18. Alternative civilian service in France is twice the length of ordinary
military service.
57. Id. at 217-18.
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sentence ultimately was reduced to one and a half years. Other
Greek conscientious objectors received sentences longer than the
standard four year period. In October 1988, two Jehovah's Wit-
nesses were sentenced to twelve and thirteen years in prison, respec-
tively. Another Jehovah's Witness had their ten year sentence re-
duced to five years, two months. Some conscientious objectors
alleged they had been ill-treated and abused in prison.68
In Hungary, 158 conscientious objectors were in prison for refus-
ing to perform military service; 146 were Jehovah's Witnesses, 6
were Roman Catholics, 1 was a Nazarene, 1 was a Seventh Day
Adventist, and the remaining 4 were non-religious conscientious ob-
jectors. Two additional objectors were imprisoned. One received a
suspended six month sentence for refusing reserve duty on religious
grounds and the other, a Roman Catholic member of a religious
community, received a one year, eight month sentence. 9
At least four Israelis were imprisoned for periods of between
fourteen and thirty-five days for refusing to serve in the Occupied
Territories. Others refused to serve in the Occupied Territories, but
were offered alternative assignments by their commanding
officers.60
In Italy, several hundred people, the majority of whom were Je-
hovah's Witnesses, were believed to be serving sentences of up to
sixteen months imprisonment as a result of their refusal on reli-
gious or political grounds to conform to the national service laws.
The period of alternative service is eight months longer than the
period of ordinary military service.61
Conscientious objectors also were serving prison terms in other
countries. Roughly 281 objectors were imprisoned in Switzerland;62
in Yugoslavia at least eight religious objectors were serving
sentences of between two to three-and-a-half years for refusing to
perform military service; 3 and in South Africa three white critics
of the government were sentenced to terms ranging from twenty-
one months to six years for refusing, based upon reasons of con-
science, to serve in the military." Two Orthodox believers were ar-
rested in 1985 in the Soviet Union for evading military service. De-
58. Id. at 222-23.
59. Id. at 224.
60. Id. at 262.
61. Id. at 225.
62. Id. at 232.
63. Id. at 244.
64. Id. at 88-89.
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spite the believers' claim that their religion forbade them to bear
weapons or to swear an oath of allegiance to a secular state, they
were sentenced to two years imprisonment. Upon their release, they
again refused military service and were sentenced to three more
years in prison based upon the same charge.6 5
B. Conscientious Objection and International Law
International human rights instruments do not explicitly recog-
nize conscientious objection to military service as a human right.
Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights6 pro-
vides for "freedom of thought, conscience and religion" which in-
cludes the right to manifest religion or belief in "teaching, practice,
worship and observance. 61 7 Article 1968 protects the freedom of
opinion and expression, but, like Article 18, does not mention con-
scientious objection to military service.
The rights enumerated in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights were elaborated upon in the 1966 International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights.69 Article 8 prohibits forced or compul-
sory labor, 70 but specifically excludes from this prohibition any ser-
vice of a military character and, in countries which recognize con-
scientious objection, any national service which may be required of
such objectors. 71 Article 8, however, does not require states to rec-
ognize conscientious objection.
Article 18 recognizes the right to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion, including the right to manifest the "religion or belief
in worship, observance, practice and teaching. ' 72 Article 18 goes on
to establish that individuals are not to be subject to coercion which
would impair their freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief
of their choice. 71 While a broad interpretation of the latter provi-
sions might include the right to conscientious objection, the cove-
nant permits limitations on such freedom of religion or belief as are
65. Id. at 238. In 1988, one of the believers lost an eye in an industrial accident at the
labor camp to which he was assigned.
66. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 1, art. 18.
67. Id.
68. Id. art. 19.
69. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967) (opened for signature, Dec.
19, 1966; entered into force, Mar. 23, 1976) (signed by the United States, Dec. 31, 1979).
70. Id. art. 8(3).
71. Id. art. 8(3)(c)(ii).
72. Id. art. 18(1).
73. Id. art. 18(2).
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prescribed by law and are "necessary to protect public safety, or-
der, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of
others."' 74 These limiting provisions arguably would permit States
Parties to refuse to recognize conscientious objection on the
grounds of public safety and order. Article 26 protects individuals
against discrimination on the grounds of religion, politics or opin-
ion. 75 Conscientious objection arguably is not protected conduct
within Article 18 and the refusal to recognize conscientious objec-
tion thus would not violate Article 26's prohibition on discrimina-
tion. In addition, denying all pacifists, whatever their motivation,
an exemption from military service arguably would not violate Ar-
ticle 26.
The inherent right to life is protected by both the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights 76 and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights. 77 This is the most basic right which may
not be abrogated even during periods of public emergency. 78 The
complimentary right not to be compelled by the state to take the
life of another, however, is not explicitly set forth. Some also may
question whether killing during warfare violates the international
covenant's prohibition on the arbitrary deprivation of human life.
Undoubtedly, given the strong emphasis upon the sanctity of
human life within human rights instruments, 79 a strong argument
may be made that the right to conscientious objection is implicitly
protected by these and other provisions within human rights instru-
ments.80 However, the argument that conscientious objection is not
protected by these human rights instruments is strengthened by the
fact that during the drafting of the international covenant, an
amendment was proposed and withdrawn by Mr. Mendez of the
Philippines which would have included a right to conscientious ob-
jection within the provision guaranteeing freedom of religion.81 The
amendment would have provided that those "who conscientiously
object to war as being contrary to their religion shall be exempt
from military service."8 2 The United Kingdom 3 and Australia 4
74. Id. art. 18(3).
75. Id. art. 26.
76. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 1, art. 3.
77. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 69, art. 6(1).
78. Id. art. 4(2).
79. See generally id. at Preamble; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note
1, at Preamble.
80. Wolff, supra note 34, at 80-89.
81. 6 U.N. ESCOR (161st mtg.) at 11-12, U.N. Doc E/CN.4/SR.161 (1950).
82. Id. at 11.
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stated that such an amendment would not be appropriately in-
cluded within a provision protecting freedom of religion. The Uru-
guayan delegate argued that conscientious objection was already
adequately covered by the provision which exempted alternative
service from the definition of compulsory and enforced labor.8 5 The
Chilean delegate articulated that service in the military did not
necessarily require involvement in or preparation for war.86 He
pointed out that the military was involved in mitigating the effects
of various emergency situations and military training was a mecha-
nism for inculcating national discipline and patriotism. 7 Some del-
egates feared that religious objectors could not be exempted with-
out political and other objectors demanding exemption from
military service.88 Mr. Mendez, faced with overwhelming opposi-
tion to his amendment, withdrew it from consideration.89 Thus,
there was a clear recognition that conscientious objection was not
to be protected as a fundamental human right within the interna-
tional covenant; and the fact that such protection was thought nec-
essary indicates it was not viewed as being protected within any
existing international instrument.
The failure to protect conscientious objection to military service
as a human right is a serious oversight which has contributed to the
abuse and imprisonment of objectors throughout the world. The in-
ternational legal protection of conscientious objectors and the es-
tablishment of minimum standards and procedures for the determi-
nation of conscientious objector status is imperative given the fact
that compulsory military service disproportionately affects young
individuals who often lack the political and economic power to in-
fluence domestic policy. The international legal system thus pro-
vides one of the few mechanisms available to protect youthful con-
scientious objectors and to establish that forcing objectors to
engage in military training is incompatible with respect for human
rights and with preparation for global peace and justice.90 However,
83. Id.
84. Id. at 12.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 11.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 12.
89. Id.
90. See Schaffer & Weissbrodt, Conscientious Objection To Military Service as a
Human Right, 9 REV. INT'L COMM'N JURISTS 33, 35 (1972). See generally Berat, Conscien-
tious Objection in South Africa: Governmental Paranoia and the Law of Conscientious Ob-
jection, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 127 (1989).
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efforts to establish an international human right to conscientious
objection, although finally experiencing some success, 91 have yet to
succeed in the formal codification of such a right.9 2
III. INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH A RIGHT TO
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION
A. Efforts at the United Nations
The first formal attempts to establish an international right to
conscientious objection occurred at the European regional level.
This provided the impetus and foundation for similar efforts at the
United Nations.
On January 26, 1967, the Consultative Assembly of the Council
of Europe ("The Assembly") adopted Resolution 337,93 which pro-
vided that "[p]ersons liable to conscription for military service who,
for reasons of conscience or profound conviction . . . refuse to per-
form armed [military] service shall enjoy a personal right to be
released from the obligation to perform such service."94 The Reso-
lution stated that such persons remain liable to perform alternative
service." The right to conscientious objection emanated from Arti-
cle 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights9" which guar-
antees freedom of thought, conscience and religion. 7 The Assembly
also recommended to the Committee of Ministers98 that they
instruct the Committee of Experts on Human Rights to formulate
proposals to give effect to the principles laid down by the Assem-
bly in its Resolution 337 by means of a Convention or a recom-
mendation to Governments so that the right of conscientious ob-
jection may be firmly implanted in all member States of the
Council of Europe." 99
91. See generally Weissbrodt, The United Nations Commission on Human Rights
Confirms Conscientious Objection to Military Service as a Human Right, 35 NETH. INT'L L.
REV. 53 (1988).
92. See generally Comment, Conscientious Objection to Military Service: A Report to
the United Nations Division of Human Rights, 12 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 359 (1982).
93. Resolution 337 on the Right of Conscientious Objection, Eur. Consult. Ass., 18th
Sess., at 1 (1967) [hereinafter Resolution 337].
94. Id. A(I).
95. Id. C(1)-(3).
96. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, art. 9, Europ. T.S. No. 5 (done at Rome, Nov. 4, 1950) (entered into force, Sept, 3,
1952).
97. Resolution 337, supra note 93, A(2).
98. Recommendation 478 on the Right of Conscientious Objection, Eur. Consult. Ass.,
18th Sess. (1967) [hereinafter Recommendation 478].
99. Id. 2(a).
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The Committee of Ministers declined to act on the Assembly's rec-
ommendation. 100 It noted that several member states had "already
settled the problems of conscientious objection in the framework of
their own law." 101 Other states, according to the Ministers, had
made it clear that they were unable, for various reasons of princi-
ple, to envisage amending their law.' 02 The Ministers went on to
observe that several member states, while supporting the ideals
which motivated the recommendation, doubted whether the actions
of the Council of Europe would lead to the enactment of an inter-
national agreement on conscientious objection. 10 3
A virtually identical recommendation was passed by the Parlia-
mentary Assembly in 1977.104 This recommendation, however, also
called upon the Ministers to take steps to "introduce the right of
conscientious objection to military service into the European Con-
vention on Human Rights.' 1 0 5 The Ministers again concluded they
were not in a position to act on the recommendation. 0 6
In 1987, however, the Ministers adopted Recommendation
(87)8107 proclaiming that anyone liable to conscription for military
service who, for compelling reasons of conscience, refuses to be in-
volved in the use of arms, shall have the right to be released from
the obligation to perform such military service. The Ministers went
on to note that such persons may be liable to perform alternative
service.'08
The European Parliament earlier had passed a February 7, 1983
resolution' declaring that the right "of freedom of conscience im-
plies the right to refuse to carry out armed military service and to
withdraw from such service on grounds of conscience." 110 The reso-
lution also proclaimed that alternative service must not be regarded
as a sanction and must be organized so as to respect both the dig-
100. Nineteenth Report of the Comm. of Ministers to the Consult. Ass., Eur. Consult.
Ass., Doc. 2359, at 160 (1967) (regarding Recommendation 478).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Recommendation 816 on the Right of Conscientious Objection to Military Ser-
vice, Eur. Parl. Ass., 29th Sess., at 1 (1977) [hereinafter Recommendation 816].
105. Id. I 4(b).
106. See Communication on the Activities of the Comm. of Ministers, Eur. Parl. Ass.,
30th Sess., Doc. 4197, at 2 (1978) (regarding Recommendation 816).
107. See Communication on the Activities of the Comm. of Ministers, Eur. Parl. Ass.,
39th Sess., Doc. 5725, at 10 (1987).
108. See Bartsch, Council of Europe-Legal Co-operation in 1987, 7 Y.B. EUR. L.
339, 347 (1988).
109. 26 O.J. EUR. COM. (No. C 68) 14 (1983).
110. Id. 1 2.
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nity of the individual and to benefit the community."' The Parlia-
ment called on the governments and parliaments of the member
states of the Community to examine their legislation on conscien-
tious objection112 and to support efforts to include the right of con-
scientious objection in the European Convention on Human
Rights. 113 These European efforts to establish both a regional and
international right to conscientious objection to military service
stimulated United Nations initiatives in the area of conscientious
objection. The Commission on Human Rights, in Resolution 11 B
(XXVII) of March 1971,11" requested the Secretary-General to
seek up-to-date information from member states on national legis-
lation and other measures and practices relating to military and
alternative service,"" and to submit a report to the Commission as
soon as possible." 6 The Commission also determined that it would
study the question of conscientious objection." 7
In 1976, the Commission on Human Rights, in Resolution 1A
(XXXII), 118 noted the report prepared by the Secretary-General on
conscientious objection and decided to give consideration to the
matter at the next available session."" The Secretary-General's re-
port was a compilation of information provided by roughly fifty-
seven countries on their domestic conscientious objector
legislation.' 2
In a key resolution in 1978, the United Nations General Assem-
bly recognized "the right of all persons to refuse service in military
or police forces which are used to enforce apartheid."'' The resolu-
I111. Id. 4.
112. Id. 11 8.
113. Id. 11 9.
114. E.S.C. Res. 11B (XXVII), 50 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 4) at 88, U.N. Doc. E/
4949; E/CN.4/1068 (1971) [hereinafter Res. 11B (XXVII)].
115. Id. 1(b). The Commission also requested the Secretary-General to make availa-
ble information on conscientious objection to military service included in the country
monographs which were prepared in connection with the Study of Discrimination in the
Matter of Religious Rights and Practices, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub. 2/200 Rev. 1, U.N.
Sales No. 60.XIV.2 (1960) cited in Comment, supra note 92, at 361.
116. Res. lIB (XXVII), supra note 114, T 1(c).
117. Id. 2.
118. E.S.C. Res. IA (XXXII), 60 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 3) at 52, U.N. Doc. E/
15768; E/CN.4/1213 (1976).
119. Id.
120. See The Role of Youth in the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights: The
Question of Conscientious Objection to Military Service, Report of the Secretary-General,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1118 (1972). See also U.N. Docs. E/CN.4/1118/Add.1 (1973); E/
CN.4/1118/Add.2 (1973); E/CN.4/ 1118/Add.3 (1973); E/CN.4/1118/Corr. 1 (1974).
121. G.A. Res. 33/165, 33 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 45) at 154, U.N. Doc. A/33/45 T
1 (1978).
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tion called upon member states "to grant asylum or safe transit...
to persons compelled to leave their country of nationality solely be-
cause of a conscientious objection to assisting in the enforcement of
apartheid through service in military or police forces."' 22 It also
urged states to consider granting to such persons all the rights and
benefits accorded to refugees.' While not strictly addressing the
right of conscientious objection, the resolution acknowledged that,
despite the demands of national sovereignty, there are certain types
of conflicts in which international law recognizes the right of the
individual to refuse to participate. 1 24
In 1980, through Resolution 38 (XXXVI), 125 the United Nations
Commission on Human Rights again requested the Secretary-Gen-
eral to seek information from member states on their national legis-
lation, and other measures and practices, relating to conscientious
objection to military service and to alternative service, together
with any comments they may wish to transmit. 126 The Secretary-
General also was requested to again submit a report containing the
information received from member states. 27 In 1981 through Reso-
lution 40 (XXXVI), 128 the Commission welcomed the replies of
member states to the Secretary-General's requests for informa-
tion,'1 29 and requested the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Dis-
crimination and Protection of Minorities to study the question of
conscientious objection to military service and the implementation
of General Assembly Resolution 33/165.130
In 1984, the Commission on Human Rights, having received the
report prepared by the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimi-
nation and Protection of Minorities on the question of conscientious
objection,' 3 ' and recognizing the great importance of conscientious
122. Id. 2 (emphasis in original).
123. Id. 3.
124. See generally G.A. Res. 35/206B, 35 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 48) at 30, U.N.
Doc. A/35/48 (1981) (resolution on military and nuclear collaboration with South Africa).
125. E.S.C. Res. 38 (XXXVI), 36 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 3) at 198, U.N. Doc. E/
1980/13; E/CN.4/1408 (1980).
126. Id. 1.
127. Id. 1 2.
128. E.S.C. Res. 40 (XXXVII), 37 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 5) at 243, U.N. Doc. E/
1981/25; E/CN.4/1475 (1981).
129. Id. 11
130. Id. 2. See generally E.S.C. Res. 1982/36, 38 ESCOR Supp. (No. 2) at 154,
U.N. Doc. E/1982/12; E/CN.4/1982/30 (1982) (resolution on the role of youth in the pro-
motion and protection of human rights, including the question of conscientious objection to
military service).
131. E.S.C. Res. 1984/33, 40 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 4) at 69, U.N. Doc. E/1984/
14; E/CN.4/1984/77 (1984) (citing Conscientious Objection, supra note 32). See also U.N.
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objection and the need to protect the human rights of objectors,
submitted a draft resolution to the Economic and Social Council."3 2
The Economic and Social Council determined that the report
should be given the widest possible distribution 3' and that it should
be transmitted for comments and observations to member states,
relevant United Nations bodies, and other international organiza-
tions.' 34 The Commission on Human Rights was requested to study
the report.1 35 In 1985, the Commission on Human Rights, pursuant
to Resolution 1985/114, adjourned without having adopted a reso-
lution on conscientious objection. 36
B. The Commission on Human Rights Resolution on
Conscientious Objection
The lengthy process of drafting a resolution recognizing a right
to conscientious objection finally resulted in some measure of suc-
cess when the Commission on Human Rights adopted Resolution
1987/46 on March 10, 1987, by a vote of twenty-six to two with
fourteen abstentions.3 7 While there is no clear explanation for the
division of votes, states with conscription which do not recognize
conscientious objection generally voted against or abstained on the
resolution, while states with volunteer military forces or states with
conscription which recognize conscientious objection voted in favor
of the resolution. 38
The ultimate preambular paragraph of the resolution recognizes
that "conscientious objection to military service derives from princi-
ples and reasons of conscience, including profound convictions, aris-
Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982/24 (1982) (preliminary report).
132. See 40 U.S. ESCOR Supp. (No. 4) at 3, U.N. Doc. E/1984/14; E/CN.4/1984/
77 (1984) (regarding the proposed Economic and Social Council resolution).
133. U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 1) at 21, 1 1(a), U.N. Doc. E/1984/84 (1985).
134. Id. I l(b).
135. Id. 3.
136. E.S.C. Res. 1985/114, 41 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 2) at 108, U.N. Doc. E/
1985/22; E/CN.4/1985/66 (1985).
137. E.S.C. Res. 1987/46, 43 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 5) at 108-09, U.N. Doc. E/
1987/18; E/CN.4/1987/60 (1987) [hereinafter Resolution 1987/46].
138. The votes on Resolution 1987/46 were as follows: In favor: Argentina, Australia,
Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, France, Gambia, Federal Re-
public of .Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Liberia, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines,
Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Togo, United Kingdom of Great Britain and North-
ern Ireland, United States of America. Against: Iraq, Mozambique. Abstaining: Algeria,
Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, China, Congo, Cyprus, Ethiopia, German
Democratic Republic, India, Mexico, Nicaragua, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Vene-
zuela, Yugoslavia. Id. at 243.
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ing from religious, ethical, moral or similar motives."13 Thus, the
basis for conscientious objection is not limited to religious grounds.
Paragraph one appeals to states to recognize that conscientious ob-
jection to military service should be considered a "legitimate exer-
cise of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion rec-
ognized by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights."" ° While
providing support for the contention that conscientious objection
falls within the internationally recognized freedoms of thought,
conscience and religion, the paragraph implicitly leaves the final
determination of this question to the discretion of each state. "
Paragraph two invites states to take measures aimed at the exemp-
tion of individuals from military service on the basis of a genuinely
held conscientious objection to armed service.' 2 These two opera-
tive paragraphs, while providing support for the principle that con-
scientious objection is a human right, are phrased as recommenda-
tions rather than as mandatory obligations of sovereignty. 143
The resolution goes on to recommend that states with compulsory
military service, which have not already done so, should consider
introducing various forms of alternative military service for consci-
entious objectors which are compatible with the reasons for consci-
entious objection.' 44 Paragraph three also recommends that states
refrain from subjecting objectors to imprisonment. Paragraph three
broadly states that alternative service should be compatible with
the reasons for conscientious objection but does not explicitly rec-
ommend that states provide both non-combatant military as well as
civilian forms of alternative service. 4 5 This paragraph also appears
to be directed to states with conscription and would not cover the
problems of in-service objectors in states with volunteer armies.
Presumably, however, such in-service objectors usually are dis-
charged from the armed forces and are not required to perform
alternative service or are subjected to imprisonment.
Paragraph four recommends that member states, if they have not
already done so, should establish within the framework of their na-
tional legal system impartial decision-making procedures to deter-
139. Id. at Preamble.
140. Id. 1.
141. See Weissbrodt, supra note 91, at 65.
142. Resolution 1987/46, supra note 137, $ 2.
143. See Weissbrodt, supra note 91, at 65.
144. Resolution 1987/46, supra note 137, 1 3.
145. Id.
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mine the validity of claims for conscientious objector status.14 This
paragraph is significantly weakened by the reference to national le-
gal systems, providing states flexibility in their procedural mecha-
nisms for the determination of conscientious objection. 14 7
The fifth operative paragraph requests the Secretary-General
again to report to the Commission on Human Rights on the ques-
tion of conscientious objection to military service.' 48 The Secretary-
General is to take into account both comments provided by states
and any further information he may receive, the latter suggesting
that the observations of non-governmental organizations may be in-
cluded in the report. 4 9
Despite opposition from states which argued that the resolution
impeded their national right of self-defense 150 and violated the duty
of all citizens to serve in the military, 51 Professor David Weissb-
rodt argues that the non-binding resolution affirms the right of con-
scientious objection as a valid exercise of the previously established
right to freedom of conscience. 52 Weissbrodt argues that the reso-
lution provides evidence that the norm of conscientious objection
exists in customary international law and serves as a catalyst to
encourage states to recognize the right of conscientious objection
within their domestic legal systems.'' Weissbrodt also notes that
such resolutions often serve as an initial step in the development of
an international treaty. 54
The resolution could have been strengthened if it explicitly had
stated that conscientious objection is a human right, rather than
merely appealing to states to recognize that conscientious objection
should be considered a legitimate exercise of the right to freedom
146. Id. 11 4.
147. A draft resolution required states to establish independent decision-making proce-
dures and did not refer to the framework of national legal systems. See E.S.C. Draft Res. E/
CN.4/1985/L.33, 41 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 2) at 180, U.N. Doc. E/1985/22; E/CN.4/
1985/66 (1985).
148. Resolution 1987/46, supra note 137, 5.
149. Id.
150. 43 U.N. ESCOR (54th mtg.) at 27, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1987/SR.54/Add. 1
(1987) (Mr. Youssif (Iraq)).
151. Id. at 28 (Mrs. Casco (Nicaragua)).
152. Weissbrodt, supra note 91, at 65. Weissbrodt concludes that the 1987 resolution
provides significant, but incomplete, support for conscientious objection as a human right. He
concedes the resolution would be stronger if it were more forcefully worded, were adopted by
consensus or unanimous vote, were codified as a Declaration or were adopted by a more
authoritative United Nations body. Still he points out that the resolution was passed by a
strong majority and that those states in opposition did not articulate principled objections to
the resolution. Id.
153. Id. at 63.
154. Id.
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of thought, conscience and religion. 155 Recognition of the right to
conscientious objection should not depend on the vagaries of domes-
tic legal interpretation and the resolution should have called upon
member states to formally codify conscientious objection as an in-
dependent international human right. 5 ' One difficulty with viewing
conscientious objection as an expression of the right to freedom of
thought, conscience and religion is that these generic rights are
themselves subject to limitation in the interests of public safety and
order.'57
In paragraph two of Resolution 1987/46, states are invited to
exempt conscientious objectors from military service. 58 The pream-
ble recognizes that conscientious objection derives from principles
and reasons of conscience, including profound convictions, arising
from religious, ethical, moral or similar motives.' 5 9 A more compre-
hensive enumeration of the grounds for conscientious objection
might also include humanitarian, philosophical or political bases as
permissible motives for conscientious objection. 60 The most contro-
versial addition would be the recognition of political grounds for
conscientious objection since this necessarily would lead to objec-
tions to particular wars, or so-called selective conscientious objec-
tion.' 6 ' The 1983 report prepared by the Sub-Commission on Pre-
vention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities explicitly
endorses exemption of those who are convinced that the armed
forces of their country are being used or may be used in the future
for purposes that are in violation of international law.' It explic-
itly includes under the rubric of this principle those whose con-
science forbids them to be involved in the enforcement of
apartheid,6 3 genocide, 6 the illegal occupation of foreign terri-
155. Resolution 1987/46, supra note 137, 1.
156. See Recommendation 816, supra note 104, 4(b), which recommends that the
Committee of Ministers introduce the right of conscientious objection into the European
Convention on Human Rights.
157. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 69, art.
18(3).
158. Resolution 1987/46, supra note 137, 1 2.
159. Id. at Preamble.
160. See Amnesty International, Policy Guidelines on Conscientious Objection 1 (re-
vised and adopted by the 13th Int'l Council, Vienna, 1980), reprinted in United Nations,
The Role of Youth in the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Including the Ques-
tion of Conscientious Objection to Military Service, Report by the Secretary-General, 7
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1985/25 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 Report by the Secretary-General].
161. See generally Greenawalt, supra note 15.
162. Conscientious Objection, supra note 32, at 6.
163. Id. at 18, 1(c).
164. Id. I I(d).
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tory,165 the gross violation of human rights,108 and those objecting
to the use of weapons of mass destruction or weapons which have
been specifically outlawed by international law or the use of means
and methods which cause unnecessary suffering.' 67 The report con-
cludes that the conscience of individuals "cannot avoid being influ-
enced by these developments of international law; were it not so
there would be hardly any point in the international community,
including in particular the United Nations, developing such
norms."'8a
The third paragraph of Resolution 1987/46 recommends that
states consider introducing various forms of alternative service for
conscientious objection which are compatible with the reasons for
conscientious objection.' 9 It also recommends that states refrain
from subjecting such persons to imprisonment. 70
As previously observed, there should be an explicit requirement
that both non-combatant alternative military service and civilian
service should be provided. The report prepared by the Sub-Com-
mission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minori-
ties makes the important recommendation that states, to the extent
possible, should seek to provide meaningful opportunities for alter-
native service, including social work or work for peace, development
and international understanding.' 7 ' The period of service for consci-
entious objection also should not exceed that required of military
conscripts. Otherwise, alternative service may be employed as a
punishment to deter and to punish conscientious objection.172 Con-
scientious objectors also should be guaranteed full social and finan-
cial equality with military conscripts and should not be discrimi-
nated against in terms of salaries, benefits and eligibility for social
welfare programs. 73
The prohibition on the imprisonment of conscientious objectors
obviously is of central importance. Protections also should be ex-
tended to those whose claims for conscientious objector status are
165. Id. I(e).
166. Id. 11(f).
167. Id. V I(g).
168. Id. at 4.
169. Resolution 1987/46, supra note 137, 11 3.
170. Id.
171. Conscientious Objection, supra note 32, at 18, 1 3.
172. Id.
173. See Resolution 337, supra note 93, 1 C(2) (providing for the social and financial
equality of recognized conscientious objectors and ordinary conscripts).
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unrecognized or who refuse alternative service. 171 For instance, an
unsuccessful claimant who is imprisoned and released should not
again be called to military service and risk being returned to
prison. 175 It also should be noted that the resolution should address
the special problems encountered by claimants for conscientious ob-
jector status whose views ripen after they join, or are conscripted
into the military, or who only learn of the availability of conscien-
tious objector status after they have been inducted into the
military.176
The Commission on Human Rights' Resolution, as previously ob-
served, recommends that states establish, within the framework of
their national legal system, impartial decision-making procedures to
determine the validity of claims for conscientious objector status.177
It clearly would be advisable to stipulate the minimum procedures
to be followed in the determination of conscientious objector status.
In 1977, the Legal Affairs Committee of the Parliamentary Assem-
bly of the Council of Europe observed that without adequate proce-
dural guarantees, the right to conscientious objection would be
"merely theoretical."' 78 The stipulation of minimum procedural
guarantees is of importance since the failure to provide adequate
procedures may serve to limit the number of recognized conscien-
tious objectors.' 79 For instance, the failure to permit an applicant to
be represented by legal counsel may disadvantage a poorly edu-
cated or inarticulate applicant. As a general principal, procedural
arrangements should be guided by the principle that no barriers
should be placed in the way of claims for conscientious objection
and that such a claim should receive all the "consideration due to it
under the rule of law."' 80
European Consultative Assembly Resolution 337 provides that
individuals are to be informed of their right to conscientious objec-
tion when notified of their call-up for military service or prospective
174. Conscientious Objection, supra note 32, at 18 (recommends that penalties should
be decided upon by an impartial civilian court applying normal procedures). The penalties
should not be excessively severe and should take account of mitigating factors, such as the
conscience or conviction of the person concerned. Id. I 4(b).
175. 1984 Report by the Secretary-General, supra note 160, at 10 (comments and
observations of the Friends World Committee for Consultation).
176. See generally Hansen, Judicial Review of In-Service Conscientious Objector
Claims, 17 UCLA L. REV. 975 (1970).
177. Resolution 1987/46, supra note 137, 11 4.
178. 1977 European Report on Conscientious Objection, supra note 4, at 11.
179. Id.
180. 1967 European Report on Conscientious Objection, supra note 35, at 11.
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call-up.' This is vital since once inducted into the military, an ob-
jector may be subject to military rather than to civilian justice.'8 2
States also should be required to disseminate information regarding
conscientious objection and should assist non-governmental organi-
zations to allow those thinking about applying for conscientious ob-
jector status.1 83 Filing a claim for conscientious objector status
should result in the suspension of an applicant's induction pending
the disposition of the case and the exhaustion of all appeals." 4
Lodging jurisdiction over conscientious objection claims in a sin-
gle government official should be prohibited.' 85 In order to insure
impartiality in decision-making, it should be specified that where
the initial decision regarding conscientious objection is made by an
administrative tribunal, the tribunal is to be entirely separate from
military authorities and its composition shall guarantee maximum
independence and impartiality. 8 The tribunal should be a demo-
cratically constituted body composed of individuals from different
spheres of public life which is presided over by an individual
trained in law.18 7
Resolution 337 requires that applicants for conscientious objector
status should receive a hearing at which they are entitled to repre-
sentation and the presence of witnesses. 88 The decisions of the ad-
ministrative authority are to be subject to review by an equally im-
partial and independent administrative body which itself is subject
to independent judicial review. 9
The approach of Commission on Human Rights Resolution
1987/46, which broadly recommends that states adopt impartial
procedures within the framework of their national legal systems,
relies heavily on the good faith of states to protect the procedural
rights of conscientious objectors.'90 However, even in the relatively
tolerant European environment, it has been noted that states gener-
181. Resolution 337, supra note 93, B(1).
182. See generally Field, Problems of Proof in Conscientious Objector Cases, 120 U.
PA. L. REV. 870, 881-85 (1972).
183. Conscientious Objection, supra note 32, 1 2(c).
184. Resolution 337, supra note 93, B(4).
185. 1967 European Report on Conscientious Objection, supra note 35, at 9.
186. Resolution 337, supra note 93, B(2).
187. 1967 European Report on Conscientious Objection, supra note 35, at 9.
188. Resolution 337, supra note 93, B(5).
189. Id. at T B(3). The burden and standard of proof are procedural concerns which
may have a significant impact on the disposition of a claim. Neither issue has yet to be given
any detailed review by an international tribunal. See generally Reisner, The Conscientious
Objector Exemption: Administrative Procedures and Judicial Review, 35 U. CHI. L. REV.
686, 713, 714 (1968).
190. Resolution 1987/46, supra note 137, T 4.
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ally have failed to provide conscientious objectors with basic due
process protections.191 On the other hand, even where stringent pro-
cedural protections are provided, it can be difficult to overcome the
animus towards conscientious objectors.' 2 In the United States
during the Vietnam War, conscientious objectors were provided
with a panoply of procedural protections. Yet studies indicate that
members of administrative boards had a difficult time intellectually
comprehending, and tended to reject, complex claims for conscien-
tious objector status.193 Board members generally were hostile to-
wards claimants and resented the fact that they interfered with the
ability of local boards to meet their quotas.' 94 A radical but per-
haps unrealistic solution to the problem of the inherent administra-
tive bias against claimants for conscientious objector status would
be to grant conscientious objector status to individuals who com-
plied with a simple registration requirement.' 95 States, however, are
not likely to agree to freely grant conscientious objector status to
registrants and risk that a substantial number of individuals will
claim such status and thus reduce the number of eligible military
conscripts.
States also should be called upon to grant asylum to conscien-
tious objectors who refuse conscription and who face punishment or
discriminatory treatment in their country of residence. Such indi-
viduals would appear to confront a well-founded fear of persecution
based upon their membership in a particular group or adherence to
a political opinion and thus satisfy the requirement for political
asylum in most states. 9 ' Lastly, steps should be taken to draft and
to present a comprehensive declaration on the right of conscientious
objection to the United Nations General Assembly. Meanwhile, the
plight of conscientious objectors throughout the globe must be
brought to the attention of the international community. A roster of
imprisoned objectors should be compiled and coordinated efforts
should be undertaken to obtain their release.
191. See 1977 European Report on Conscientious Objection, supra note 4, at 12.
192. See 1967 European Report on Conscientious Objection, supra note 35, at 10.
193. See Rabin, Do You Believe in a Supreme Being-The Administration of the
Conscientious Objector Exemption, 1967 Wisc. L. REV. 642, 658.
194. See Rabin, A Strange Brand of Selectivity: Administrative Law Perspectives on
the Processing of Registrants in the Selective Service System, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1005, 1019
(1970).
195. See 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 68) 14 (1983). One concern is that intricate
procedural protections may have the unintended consequence of discriminating against uned-
ucated and economically disadvantaged applicants. See Field, supra note 182, at 934.
196. See Conscientious Objection, supra note 32, at 18, 1 5.
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IV. CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION AND THE RIGHT TO PEACE
It is ironic that conscientious objection to military service has not
yet been codified as a human right given the fact that the initiation
of armed military conflict could result in the extinction of global
society which has been legally and morally condemned.197 The
question no longer is whether a select few should be exempt from
military service on the grounds of conscientious objection to war,
but whether a government may compel any of its citizens to engage
in organized collective violence which is undertaken for reasons
which are violative of the United Nations Charter.
The "just war" doctrine, first developed by St. Augustine in the
fourth century, differentiated between theologically justifiable and
unjustifiable uses of military force by secular authorities.19 8 How-
ever, the techniques of war have evolved to the point where war,
other than when undertaken in self-defense, is considered theologi-
cally immoral. 199 Pope Paul VI, in his address on the duty of peace
to the United Nations in 1978, noted that war "has always been, in
itself, a supremely irrational and morally unacceptable means of
regulating the relationships between states, though without
prejudice to the right of legitimate defense. '"200 He previously had
called for arms and war, "in a word, to be excluded from civiliza-
tion's programs. '"201 These sentiments were echoed by the United
States Catholic Bishops, which in 1976 queried whether modern
warfare ever can be "morally justified. 2 °2
Contemporary international legal doctrine parallels the theologi-
cal distinction between justifiable wars of self-defense and other un-
197. See generally Lippman, Nuclear Weapons and International Law: Towards a
Declaration on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Nuclear Humancide, 8 Loy.
L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 183 (1986).
198. R. MCSORLEY, KILL FOR PEACE? 30 (1970). A "just war" must meet several
conditions: all non-military options must have been exhausted; it must have been undertaken
for a good cause, such as self-defense or the defense of fundamental rights; non-combatant
immunity must be respected; and the force employed must be proportionate to the goal
sought to be achieved. Id. at 31.
199. Id. at 33. See generally United States v. Berg, 310 F. Supp. 1157 (D. Me. 1970)
(recognition of conscientious objector status for a devout Catholic applicant who believes
conditions for a "just war" no longer can be met and all war is immoral).
200. Pope Paul VI, Message to the General Assembly of the U.N. for Its Session on
Disarmament, May 24, 1978, in NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT: KEY STATEMENTS OF POPES, BISH-
OPS, COUNCILS AND CHURCHES 34, 36, (R. Heyer ed. 1982) [hereinafter NUCLEAR
DISARMAMENT].
201. Pope Paul VI, Annual Message for Day of Peace, January 1, 1976, in NUCLEAR
DISARMAMENT, supra note 200, at 28.
202. United States Catholic Bishops, To Live in Christ Jesus, November 11, 1976, in
NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, supra note 200, at 90.
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justifiable deployments of armed force. In reaction to the ominous
threat of modern war, international law has enshrined the achieve-
ment of peaceful relations among states as a principal goal of the
community of nations and as a fundamental collective human
right.2" 3
The preamble to the United Nations Charter states that the
United Nations is "determined to save succeeding generations from
the scourge of war ' 20 4 and to ensure "that armed force shall not be
used, save in the common interest.120 5 The Charter establishes the
maintenance of international peace and security as one of the pri-
mary purposes of the United Nations.206 Article 2(4) admonishes
states to "refrain . . . from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations. 2 17
The Charter establishes two limited exceptions to "threat or use
of force:" acts of national and collective self-defense and acts by
the Security Council to meet threats to the peace. Article 51 recog-
nizes the "inherent right of individual collective self-defense if an
armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until
the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security. '20 s The Security Council is au-
thorized to take action against "the existence of any threat to the
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken. 20 9 In
meeting a threat to the peace, the Security Council "may take such
action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain
or restore international peace and security. 210 Member states are
obligated to make available to the Security Council such military
forces, assistance and facilities as are necessary for the purpose of
maintaining international peace and security.211
Thus, under the United Nations Charter, the independent exer-
cise of armed force by a nation-state is limited to acts of self-de-
203. See generally Treaty Providing for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of
National Policy (Kellogg-Briand Pact), 46 Stat. 2343, T.S. No. 796 (1928).
204. U.N. CHARTER Preamble.
205. Id.
206. Id. art. 1, 1.
207. Id. art. 2, 4.
208. Id. art. 51.
209. Id. art. 39.
210. Id. art. 42.
211. Id. art. 43, 1.
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fense and collective self-defense . 12 According to Daniel Webster's
well-known formulation in the Caroline case,21 a government in-
voking the right of self-defense must demonstrate a "necessity of
self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and
no moment for deliberation. ' 2 4 The response must also be propor-
tionate to the provocation. Thus, "when defensive action is greatly
in excess of the provocation, as measured by relative casualties or
scale of weaponry, international opinion will more readily condemn
such defense as illegally disproportionate." '215
The use of armed force in a fashion which contravenes the
United Nations Charter carries both individual and collective crim-
inal liability. The Nuremberg Tribunal punished Nazi leaders for
the rather amorphous international offense of the planning or wag-
ing a war of aggression or a war in violation of international trea-
ties.21 The Tribunal clearly stated that the legality of a country's
deployment of armed military force ultimately was a question of
international rather than domestic law.217 In 1974, the United Na-
tions Resolution on the Definition of Aggression21s clarified the con-
cept of aggression, defining it as the use of armed force in a "man-
ner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations . .219
Article 2 emphasizes that the "first use of armed force by a state in
contravention of the Charter shall constitute prima facie evidence
of an act of aggression," 220 and no political, economic or military
motive may serve as a justification for aggression.221 "A war of ag-
gression is a crime against international peace. Aggression gives
212. Armed force also may be justified in the struggle for self-determination; see gen-
erally Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A.
Res. 1514 (XV), 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1961).
213. Moore, The "Caroline" Case, 2 DIG. INT'L L. 409-14 (1906) cited in Lippman,
First Strike Nuclear Weapons and the Justifiability of Civil Resistance Under International
Law, 2 TEMP. INT'L. & CoMP. L.J. 155, 164 (1988).
214. Letter from Mr. Webster to Mr. Fox, (Apr. 24, 1841) 29 Brit. and Foreign St.
Papers 1129, 1138 (1840-41), quoted in Zedalis, Preliminary Thoughts on Some Unresolved
Questions Involving the Law of Anticipatory Self-Defense, 19 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 129
(1987).
215. Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620,
1637 (1984), quoted in Lippman, supra note 213, at 164.
216. 22 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILI-
TARY TRIBUNAL 461 (1948) [hereinafter TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS].
217. Id. at 450.
218. Resolution on the Definition of Aggression, GA. Res. 3314 (XXIX), 29 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974) (nonbinding).
219. Id. art. 1.
220. Id. art. 2.
221. Id. art. 5(1).
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rise to international responsibility." '222 No territorial acquisition or
advantage resulting from aggression shall be "recognized as law-
ful." 22 The deployment of military tactics and strategies which
contravene international treaties also has been recognized as giving
rise to criminal liability.22
The international community not only has limited the use of
armed force, but has imposed an affirmative duty upon states to
take steps to achieve the collective right to peace of all peoples. The
1978 Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for Life in
Peace225 invites "States to guide themselves in their activities by
the recognition of the supreme importance and necessity of estab-
lishing, maintaining and strengthening a just and durable peace for
present and future generations. '226 The first operative paragraph
proclaims that every nation and every human being has the "inher-
ent right to life in peace. ' 227 The second paragraph reiterates that
the planning, preparation or initiation of a war of aggression is a
crime against peace which is prohibited by international law.228
Paragraph three claims that states have the duty to refrain from
propaganda for wars of aggression.229
The 1984 Declaration on the Right of Peoples to Peace2 30 pro-
claims that life without war serves as the primary international pre-
requisite for the material well-being and development of countries
and for the provision of fundamental human rights.23 1 In the nu-
clear age, the preservation of peace also is considered to be central
to the preservation of human civilization.232 Given the importance
222. Id. art. 5(2).
223. Id. art. 5(3).
224. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, arts. 49-51, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No.
3362; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Ship-
wrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, arts. 50-52, 6 U.S.T. 3217,
T.I.A.S. No. 3363; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug.
12, 1949, arts. 129-31, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 146-48, 6 U.S.T. 3516,
T.I.A.S. No. 3365, (provisions imposing criminal liability for grave breaches of the
conventions).
225. Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace, G.A. Res. 33/73,
33 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 45) at 55, U.N. Doc. A/33/45 (1979).
226. Id. § I, Preamble.
227. Id. § 1, 1 1.
228. Id. § I, 1 2.
229. Id. § I, 3.
230. Declaration on the Right of Peoples to Peace, G.A. Res. 39/11, 39 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 51) at 220, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1985).
231. Id. at Preamble.
232. Id.
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of international cooperation and tranquility, the declaration stipu-
lates that the "maintenance of a peaceful life for peoples is the
sacred duty of each State. '2 33 Paragraph one proclaims that "the
peoples of our planet have a sacred right to peace; ' 23" and para-
graph two declares that each state has the fundamental obligation
to preserve and to promote "the right of peoples to peace. "2 3 5 Para-
graph four appeals to all states and international organizations to
assist in implementing the right to peace through the adoption of
appropriate measures at both the national and international
level. 23 6 These steps, as enumerated in paragraph three, should be
directed towards the elimination of the threat of conventional and
nuclear war, the renunciation of the use of force in international
relations, and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful
means.
23 7
Reviewing the activities of the United Nations, Professor Ved
Nanda concludes that the right to peace now has been established
as a fundamental, collective human right.238 In Nanda's view,
states have the duty to refrain from the threat or use of armed
force, are obligated to resolve international disputes by peaceful
means, and should strive to lessen domestic and international ten-
sions through the promotion of human rights and economic devel-
opment.23 9 As a corollary to the duty of states to promote peace,
Nanda argues that individuals' have the right to participate in deci-
sion-making on war-peace issues, to promote peaceful governmental
policies, and "to object to, challenge and oppose those polices an
individual perceives to be threatening or inviting the use of
force. 24
0
Based upon these international instruments, conscientious objec-
tion to aggressive war, rather than only being conceived of as an
expression of the individual right to freedom of conscience, thought
and religion, thus may be viewed as an affirmation of the funda-
mental collective human right of all peoples to peace. The assertion
of this collective right may conflict with state sovereignty and self-
interest. However, the Nuremberg Tribunal explicitly stated that
233. Id.
234. Id. 11.
235. Id. V 2.
236. Id. 1 4.
237. Id. 1 3.
238. Nanda, Nuclear Weapons and the Right to Peace Under International Law, 9
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 283, 289 (1983).
239. Id. at 293.
240. Id.
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"individuals have international duties which transcend the national
obligations of obedience imposed by the individual state."2 1 The
Nuremberg decision also noted that individuals "cannot obtain im-
munity while acting in pursuance of the authority of the state, if
the state in authorizing action moves outside its competence under
international law."2"" It is true that the Nuremberg Tribunal did
not explicitly impose criminal liability and a duty to resist war
crimes on ordinary civilians and soldiers.24 But the spirit of Nu-
remberg dictates that individuals refuse to be coerced into partici-
pating in illegal actions, despite the fact that they themselves may
not incur criminal liability.244
Thus, individuals certainly have the prerogative under interna-
tional law to refuse conscription for any purpose other than to de-
fend their country against an immediate armed attack. An individ-
ual's willingness to use force in self-defense or in some future
hypothetical situation does not negate the sincerity of their claim to
conscientious objector status.2 45 The Nuremberg Tribunal limited
the superiors orders defense and required individuals to resist ille-
gal orders unless no moral choice was possible.246 It seems realistic
to contend, given the dynamic nature of international law, 2" 7 that
the same degree of moral autonomy and responsibility now is re-
quired of individuals in regard to the far easier step of resistance to
conscription.248
In sum, the use of armed force has been severely limited under
international law and the illegal use of force is punishable by the
imposition of international criminal liability upon governmental of-
ficials. Armed aggression ravages societies, threatens the global en-
vironment, drains resources from economic development and often
results in a limitation upon fundamental rights such as the freedom
to criticize and to publicize governmental activities. A world free of
241. TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 216, at 466.
242. Id.
243. See United States v. Krauch, 8 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREM-
BERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS 1124-26 (1952) quoted in Lippman, Reflections on Non-Violent
Resistance and the Necessity Defense, I 1 Hous. J. INT'L L. 277, 290 (1989).
244. The Nuremberg Trials and Objection to Military Service in Viet-Nam, 63 AM.
Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 140, 172 (1969) (comments of Professor John H.E. Fried) [hereinafter
The Nuremberg Trials].
245. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 454 (1971) (conscientious objector
statute does not permit selective conscientious objection).
246. TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 216, at 466.
247. Id. at 464.
248. The Nuremberg Trials, supra note 244, at 169 (comments of Professor Robert K.
Woetzel).
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armed aggression and conflict thus is a prerequisite for the achieve-
ment of a just and humane world. Cognizant of the relationship
between a stable world order and the well-being of individuals,
United Nations resolutions have imposed an affirmative duty upon
states to provide for the collective right to peace for all peoples.
The pronouncements of international human rights instruments
would be of little significance absent the provision for a collective
right to peace.
Implicit in the international limitation upon the use of armed
force and the duty placed upon states to provide for a collective
right to peace is the right of individuals to conscientiously object to
participation in the illegal exercise of armed force. Conscientious
objection is perhaps the most meaningful avenue for individuals to
express their inherent right to peace, to protect others from being
victimized by armed conflict, and to help to create a world in which
the conditions can be created for the achievement of individual
human rights and socio-economic development. Given the relatively
weak and ineffective international mechanisms for the control and
resolution of armed conflicts, the right to peace can best be guaran-
teed by individuals conscientiously objecting to cooperation with,
and participation in, illegal wars of aggression.
In the new, emerging world order, the well-being of the individ-
ual is primary and a regime's international legitimacy is dependent
upon its willingness and ability to protect fundamental human
rights. The arbitrary deployment of armed force, with its attendant
destructive impact on the individual and society, no longer may be
considered an inherent attribute of state sovereignty. States, as a
corollary to their duty to guarantee the right to peace, do not have
the prerogative of requiring their citizens to support or to partici-
pate in the use of armed force which is prohibited under interna-
tional law. Conscription, under international law, only may be
deployed for purely defensive wars and, even in these circum-
stances, the right of conscientious objection for the traditional rea-
sons of conscience, thought, religion, philosophy and political ideol-
ogy should be recognized. State officials who refuse to recognize or
to adequately protect conscientious objectors to military service
thus in most cases are guilty of human rights violations. While the
right to conscientious objection is implicit in existing international
instruments, it requires formal international codification to insure
that it is recognized as a human right and respected by states in all
instances involving the deployment of armed military force.
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CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION
CONCLUSION
Conscientious objection is a blatant omission from the list of in-
ternationally mandated human rights. A majority of states with
conscription do not recognize conscientious objection and objectors
in these countries often are subjected to harassment, discrimination
and punishment. States which recognize conscientious objection
vary in their standards and procedures. International efforts to es-
tablish a right to conscientious objection and uniform procedural
protections for conscientious objectors, after several decades, still
have not met with success. The United Nations Commission on
Human Rights Resolution on Conscientious Objection, although an
important step, remains in need of significant modification and im-
provement. It is imperative that the United Nations General As-
sembly adopt a comprehensive declaration on the right to conscien-
tious objection. Until conscientious objection is internationally
protected, the human rights agenda will remain incomplete. As Jus-
tice Jackson observed in West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette,241 9 the right to differ as to inconsequential matters is the
"mere shadow of freedom"25 and the true test of human autonomy
is the protection of the "right to differ as to things that touch the
heart of the existing order."2 51
This Article has suggested that conscientious objection, rather
than only being viewed as a question of the freedom of conscience,
thought and religion of a select few, also should be conceived of as
an expression of the collective right to peace of all peoples. States,
other than when acting in conformity with the United Nations
Charter, have no legitimate claim to involuntarily conscript individ-
uals into military service. In such cases, all individuals have the
right to resist military service and to assert the primacy of interna-
tional law over the lawlessness of sovereign states. Those states
which confront no threat to their territorial integrity and survival
and which persist in the gratuitous punishment and imprisonment
of conscientious objectors are acting in an internationally criminal
fashion.
It is anachronistic that those who advocate peace are labeled as
criminals while those who engage in war and threaten the survival
of the planet are feted as world leaders. The conscientious objector
249. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
250. Id. at 642.
251. Id.
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is expressing the legal right and moral duty of all peoples to resist
the militerization which threatens to extinguish global society. 252
Objectors serve as a reminder that "since wars begin in the minds
of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be
constructed. '2 53
252. See the rather chilling data on the impact of war and current military expendi-
tures on human health and welfare contained in R. SIVARD, WORLD MILITARY AND SOCIAL
EXPENDITURES 1989 (13th ed. 1989).
253. Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace, supra note 225, at
Preamble.
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